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ABSTRACT 
There are many potential targets for terrorists in the United States, one of 
which is the food supply system. An attack on the food supply system would 
create great need for information to many audiences, primarily the general public, 
about the risk resulting from such an attack. 
The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, a collaborative 
effort of 10 states, has identified the need for development of a strategy for 
communicating to the public the risk resulting from an agroterrorism incident. 
Before the Partnership begins development of a strategy, however, it must take 
into consideration the factors that are important when communicating about 
agroterrorism risk: recognition that communication of risk about food carries with 
it specific challenges; the public’s level of trust in government will affect how it 
perceives and accepts risk messages; and Americans’ post-September 11, 2001 
fear associated with terrorism alters perception and acceptance of risk. 
Recognition of the existence of these factors is not enough, however. The 
Partnership must recognize, as well, that these factors may present barriers to 
effective communication. To overcome these barriers, the Partnership should 
apply tried-and-true risk communication principles, tailored to specifically address 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001, brought to Americans the awareness that we are 
susceptible to terrorist attack. There are many potential targets for terrorists in 
the United States, one of which is our food supply system. Not only would an 
attack on the agricultural food supply system economically and psychologically 
affect farmers and producers, but it could have an enormous effect on the 
American public’s confidence in the food they eat and as a result, on the nation’s 
economy.  
The United States’ food supply system is a critical component of our 
nation’s bio-defense system and could present an accessible and efficient 
delivery system for terrorist attacks against large populations and economic 
sectors. If an attack on the nation’s food supply were to occur, there would be a 
great need for information to many audiences, primarily the general public. 
The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, a collaborative 
effort of 10 states, has identified the need for development of an interstate risk 
communication strategy as a priority of the Agriculture Counterterrorism Project.  
Currently, there is no model or strategy that will fit the needs of the 
Partnership for communicating agricultural risk to the public on a collaborative, 
interstate scale. This is a problem not only for the Partnership, but for states 
across the nation that will need to present to the public a unified, coordinated 
message in order to prevent possible fear associated with conflicting information 
or misinformation, and the resultant loss of public confidence in agricultural 
products. 
However, before the Partnership begins development of a collaborative 
risk communication strategy, it must first closely examine the factors that make 
agroterrorism incidents unique.  
Risk communication is not an exact science. There are many approaches 
to communicating to the public about a hazard and its resultant risk. No one 
2 
approach fits all situations or hazards. It is important, therefore, for 
communicators to understand the factors that make communicating about an 
agroterrorism risk unique. This thesis will focus on three of those factors, and put 
forth recommendations to the Partnership that will help members better inform 
the public given the factors that make agroterrorism risk communication a special 
challenge. 
Chapter II introduces the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture 
and the Agriculture Counterterrorism Project, which was the impetus for the 
author’s research into the challenges of communicating the risk associated with 
an agroterrorism incident. Chapter III provides a brief description of risk 
communication theory and practices. Chapter IV defines and examines 
agroterrorism and the conditions that make the United States vulnerable to an 
attack to its food supply system. Chapter V outlines three factors that make 
communicating risk resulting from an agroterrorism incident different from 
communicating about other types of risk. Chapter VI provides practical 
recommendations, based on the factors identified in Chapter V, that the 
Partnership may utilize as it develops its risk communication strategy for the 
Agriculture Counterterrorism Project. Finally, Appendix A is an agroterrorism risk 
communication guide, based on findings and recommendations from this thesis, 













II. MULTI-STATE PARTNERSHIP 
The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture was created to 
ensure that America’s agricultural system is secure, citizens are safe and the 
nation’s economy is strong. Through this interstate agreement, states work 
together on surveillance of, preparation for, and response to threats in 
agriculture, whether intentionally introduced or naturally occurring, and 
coordinate those efforts with all levels of government.1 
In July of 2003, an initial group, comprised of representatives from Iowa, 
Missouri, Illinois, and Wisconsin, drafted key partnership principles, including 
several strategic goals: 
• Promote awareness of agro-terrorism vulnerabilities and 
consequences at all levels of government. 
• Build an understanding of common concerns and vulnerabilities with 
regard to safety and security of the U.S. food supply and agriculture. 
• Develop a protocol for resource sharing that addresses the issues of 
resource coordination, laboratory capacity, information sharing, joint 
planning, education, training, and exercise opportunities, and interstate 
surveillance. 
• Develop a unified approach with specific security standards to animal 
and food security, specifically addressing issues regarding disease 
detection, animal identification, and animal movement, between states, 
federal agencies, and private industry. 
• Develop joint strategies for maintaining public and consumer 
confidence.2 
In August of 2003, the original discussion group was expanded to 
encompass additional states and state government departments, and a kickoff 
summit was held in Des Moines, Iowa. Agency representatives from homeland 
security, emergency management, agriculture, and state veterinarians attended 
from the states of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin. Since that summit, Kentucky and Oklahoma have joined                                             
1 Mission Statement for the Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, August 2003. 
2 Gordon, Ellen M., Multi-State Initiatives—Agriculture Security Preparedness, Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2004. 
4 
the Partnership. Through consensus, the participants identified many areas for 
potential collaboration and agreed to form a partnership specifically designed to 
address the issues they had identified. The Partnership created three 
workgroups. The first workgroup focused on the use of resource sharing 
agreements, including the safety of plants and livestock, and the United States 
food supply processing and distribution mechanisms. The second workgroup 
focused on state-to-state issues of interstate collaboration for prevention of, 
planning for, and response to agricultural emergencies. The third workgroup 
focused on how state partners could best affect national policy and standards.3   
The workgroups identified the need for improved communications, 
surveillance, and cooperation in animal identification. In order to carry out 
projects to fulfill the identified needs, the third workgroup, the State-to-Federal 
Workgroup, in conjunction with the State of Iowa, applied for and received a 
Department of Homeland Security grant. The grant, the Agriculture 
Counterterrorism Project, focuses on three areas: development of a model 
electronic syndromic surveillance and disease reporting system; investigation 
and development of mechanisms for interstate collaboration and animal tracking; 
and a state-to-state communications strategy.4 This thesis will focus on the risk 
communication component of the Partnership’s communications strategy. 
                                            
3 Gordon, Ellen M., Multi-State Initiatives—Agriculture Security Preparedness, Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2004, pp. 21-23. 
4 Ibid., p. 23. 
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III. RISK COMMUNICATION  
We live in a world of innumerable risks. Each day, it seems, we learn from 
the media, from our families, from our coworkers and friends, of a new hazard to 
our health, our safety, our way of life. Often there is little information immediately 
available to help us understand the risks posed by those hazards. When that is 
the case, how can we make decisions about those risks and how we will act 
upon or address them, if at all? 
A.  DEFINING RISK COMMUNICATION 
The practice of risk communication helps us to understand the hazard, its 
consequences, and actions we may or should take if we are faced with that 
hazard. Risk communication is a science-based approach for communicating 
effectively in high-concern situations and provides a set of principles and tools 
that may be used to eliminate barriers to effective communication that arise in 
those situations.5 According to risk communication expert Vincent Covello, in an 
emotionally-charged environment, the rules for effective communication change 
and familiar and traditional approaches to communication may not be suitable or 
may make the situation worse. Covello says risk communication offers insight 
into how these high-concern situations, where there are often strong emotions 
such as fear, anxiety, distrust, anger, outrage, helplessness, and frustration, can 
alter the usual rules of communication.6  
In Risk Communication, A Handbook for Communicating Environmental, 
Safety and Health Risks, Regina Lundgren and Andrea McMakin describe the 
risk communication process as beginning with a hazard, a potential or actual 
danger to the environment or human health or safety. The organization that is 
responsible for managing the risks posed by the hazard begins a risk                                             
     5 Covello, Vincent T., Peters, Richard G., Wojtecki, Joseph G., and Hyde, Richard C., 
“Risk Communication, the West Nile Virus Epidemic, and Bioterrorism: Responding to the 
Communication Challenges Posed by the Intentional or Unintentional Release of a Pathogen in 
an Urban Setting,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine v. 78, 
No. 2, p. 3, 2001, available at www.centerforriskcommunication.com/pubs/crc-p1.pdf, accessed 
November 11, 2004. 
 6 Ibid. 
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assessment. Risk managers use information from the risk assessment to decide 
how to handle the risk. Their decisions are communicated to the people who are 
affected by or interested in the risk.7 
Lundgren and McMakin present an overview of 12 common approaches to 
risk communication that take into consideration how messages are sent and 
received, how conflicts are managed, and how decisions are made.8 Approaches 
range from C.D. Shannon’s traditional one-way communication model developed 
in 1948 which consists of an information source, message, communication 
channel and receiver, to more recently developed approaches that stress the 
importance of interaction and dialogue between communicators and the public.9 
The authors point out that each approach views risk communication from a 
different perspective, and that the more perspectives communicators understand, 
the more likely they will be able to implement the approaches that will meet the 
needs of a particular audience or situation, making it more likely that their 
communication efforts will succeed.10 
B. ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL 
There is no one-approach-fits-all formula for communicating risk. Because 
there are many types of risk, many different communicators who relay 
information about risk, and many situations in which risk may occur, there must 
be flexibility and knowledge of useful approaches when choosing how to best 
inform the public about that risk. There are, however, some generally accepted 
principles that are common and useful when communicating risk that can be 




                                            
 7 Lundgren, Regina and McMakin, Andrea, Risk Communication: A Handbook for 
Communicating Environmental, Safety, and Health Risks, third edition, p. 7. 
8 Ibid., p. 13. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. 
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C. RISK COMMUNICATION RULES 
Covello has outlined seven rules for effectively communicating risk 
information. These rules provide communicators with basic and common-sense 
guidelines to communicating risk.11 
RULE 1. ACCEPT AND INVOLVE THE PUBLIC AS A 
LEGITIMATE PARTNER. 
Two basic tenets of risk communication in a democracy are 
generally understood and accepted. First, people and communities 
have a right to participate in decisions that affect their lives, their 
property, and the things they value. Second, the goal of risk 
communication should not be to diffuse public concerns or avoid 
action. The goal should be to produce an informed public that is 
involved, interested, reasonable, thoughtful, solution-oriented, and 
collaborative. 
RULE 2.  PLAN CAREFULLY AND EVALUATE PERFORMANCE. 
Different goals, audiences and media require different risk 
communication strategies. Risk communication will be successful 
only if carefully planned and evaluated. 
RULE 3.  LISTEN TO YOUR AUDIENCE. 
People in the community are often more concerned about issues 
such as trust, credibility, control, competence, voluntariness, 
fairness, caring, and compassion than about mortality statistics and 
the details of quantitative risk assessment. If you do not listen to 
people, you cannot expect them to listen to you. Communication is 
a two-way activity. 
RULE 4.  BE HONEST, FRANK AND OPEN. 
In communicating risk information, trust and credibility are your 
most precious assets. Trust and credibility are difficult to obtain. 
Once lost they are almost impossible to regain. 
 
 
                                            
9 Covello, Vincent T., McCallum, David B., and Pavlova, Maria T., eds., Effective Risk 
Communication: The Role and Responsibility of Government and Nongovernment Organizations,  
p. 302. 
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RULE 5.  COORDINATE AND COLLABORATE WITH OTHER 
CREDIBLE SOURCES. 
Allies can help you communicate risk information effectively. Few 
things make risk communication more difficult than conflicts or 
disagreements with other credible sources. 
RULE 6.  MEET THE NEEDS OF THE MEDIA. 
The media are prime transmitters of information on risks. They play 
a critical role in setting agendas and in determining outcomes. The 
media are generally more interested in politics than in risk; more 
interested in simplicity than in complexity; and more interested in 
danger than in safety. 
RULE 7.  SPEAK CLEARLY AND WITH COMPASSION. 
Technical language and jargon are useful as professional 
shorthand. But they are barriers to successful communication with 
the public. 
Failure to plan carefully or ignore the rules of risk communication outlined 
by Covello can result in substantial consequences. These include:  
• Bitter and protracted debates and conflicts between communicators 
and their audience 
• High levels of public outrage  
• The diversion of societal attention and resources from important 
problems to less important problems  
• The diversion of individual attention from significant risks to 
insignificant risks and  
• Unnecessary human suffering due to high levels of anxiety, fear, 
outrage, and worry.12 
To avoid those consequences, organizations must not only have a good 
understanding of approaches to and principles of risk communication, but also 
have knowledge of the risk about which they are communicating. For 
agroterrorism, there are factors that must be taken into consideration when 
                                            
 12 Covello, Vincent T., Peters, Richard G., Wojtecki, Joseph G., and Hyde, Richard C., “Risk 
Communication, the West Nile Virus Epidemic, and Bioterrorism: Responding to the 
Communication Challenges Posed by the Intentional or Unintentional Release of a Pathogen in 
an Urban Setting,” Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine v. 78, 
No. 2, p. 3, 2001, available at www.centerforriskcommunication.com/pubs/crc-p1.pdf, accessed 
November 11, 2004. 
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providing information about a risk to the food supply system. Those factors will 
















































Since September 11, 2001, much of America’s resources and attention 
have turned to the topic of terrorism in our homeland. Agroterrorism, however, 
has received relatively little attention.  
This lack of attention to the possibility of an attack on the United States’ 
food supply system stems, in part, from the widely-held belief that agroterrorism 
is not an adequate platform upon which to produce mass casualties.13 However, 
this focus on mass casualties fails to take into account the economic disruption 
and political and social instability that an agroterrorism attack could create.14 
Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either 
against livestock or into the food chain, to undermine socioeconomic stability 
and/or generate fear.15 It can be a tactic to generate economic, social, and 
political disruption, or as a form of direct human aggression.16  
The targets of agroterrorism can be anything or anyone from the food 
supply system, from the farm to the dinner table, and include livestock, crops, 
timber, farmers and producers, grain holding facilities, food processors and 
processing facilities, slaughter houses, grocery stores, county and state fairs, 
transportation modalities, restaurants and their staff, one or more main sectors of 
                                            
13 Greco, Jeff, A Report from the Agricultural Committee of the Midwest Legislative 
Conference, The Council of State Governments, “Agricultural Terrorism in the Midwest: Risks, 
Threats and State Responses,” December 2002, p. 4. 
14 Chalk, Peter, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 
Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry”, at 
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf, accessed November 3, 2004, p. xi. 
15 Chalk, Peter November 2003.  “The Bio-Terrorist Threat to Agricultural Livestock and 
Produce, Testimony presented before the Government Affairs Committee of the United States 
Senate”, on November 19, 2003, p. 2, available at 
www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT213/CT213.pdf, accessed November 3, 2004. 
 16 Ibid. 
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agriculture such as the pork industry, wildlife, municipal water supplies, or the 
U.S. economy as a whole.17  
A.  ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE 
The U.S. agriculture economy is vital to the nation’s economy. The food 
and fiber system comprises the economic activities of the farms and firms that 
process, assemble, and transform raw agricultural commodities into final 
products. In 2001, the U.S. food and fiber system accounted for 12.3 percent of 
the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and added roughly $1.24 trillion to 
the U.S. economy.18 In 2002, total gross farm sales in the U.S. were over $207 
billion.19 
Nearly 24 million people were employed in the food and fiber system in 
2001. An estimated 800,000 jobs were generated by agricultural exports in 2001. 
Of those 800,000 jobs, 344,000 were on farms, the others in supporting jobs in 
food processing, manufacturing plants, and the transportation and trade 
sectors.20 
Agricultural exports are an important contributor to the U.S. economy and 
have far-reaching effects. Every dollar of exports in 2001 generated an additional 
$1.48 in economic activity in supporting sectors.21 In 2001, total exports in 
agricultural products were valued at $53.3 billion22, while in 2002, the U.S. 
                                            
17 Davis, Radford G., Agroterrorism: Overview of a Sleeping Target, p. 3. 
18 “Amber Waves:  The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources and Rural 
America,” available at www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/September03/Indicator, accessed 
December 29, 2004. 
19 “2002  Census of Agriculture Volume 1 Chapter 1:  U.S. National Level Data,” available at 
www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/index1.htm, accessed December 29, 2004. 
20 “Food market structures: the U.S. food and fiber system,” available at 





exported $53.7 billion of agricultural products. In both 2001 and 2002, agricultural 
products accounted for 8 percent of all U.S. exports. 23 
B.  VULNERABILITIES 
“For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not 
attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.”24  
The above quote, from Tommy Thompson during the December 3, 2004, 
announcement of his resignation as Health and Human Services Secretary, is 
indicative of the growing realization and acceptance that vulnerabilities exist in 
America’s food supply system that make it a potential terrorist target. 
In Current Trends in Agro-terrorism and Their Potential Impact on Food 
Security, Joseph Foxell, Jr. identifies 10 factors that contribute to America’s 
vulnerability to agroterrorism. 
• The livestock industry is concentrated in just a few essential 
geographic sectors: cattle feeding in western Kansas; hogs in North 
Carolina, Nebraska, and Iowa; and poultry in Virginia, Georgia, 
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Maryland’s Eastern Shore district. This 
concentration would make it easier for agroterrorists to spread an 
agricultural disease by infecting only a small number of animals. 
• The U.S. food business is moving in the direction of centralized 
ownership and larger individual farms. For example, by 2010, it’s 
predicted that the 30 leading cattle feeding corporations will generate 
50 percent of all beef products. 
• Intensive animal husbandry practices have reduced the free range 
movement of farm animals on many of the largest farms, causing the 
American poultry and livestock industries to become much more 
vulnerable to the spread of both indigenous and foreign-originating 
infectious diseases. These practices have lead animals to be 
increasingly vulnerable to disease from increased stress levels that 
have lowered the animals’ tolerance to fight disease, and from the 
overuse of antibiotics that have left animals vulnerable to “super bugs” 
that are resistant to treatment. 
                                            
23 “2002  Census of Agriculture Volume 1 Chapter 1:  U.S. National Level Data,” available at 
www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/index1.htm, accessed December 29, 2004. 
24 Associated Press, “Thompson Resigns with Grim Warning,” MSNBC News Services, 
December 3, 2004, available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6644980/print/1/displaymode/1098/, 
accessed January 6, 2005. 
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• Increased levels of international air travel have greatly reduced the 
isolation that had previously protected American poultry, livestock, and 
field crops from foreign animal illnesses and pests, increasing the 
vulnerability of the U.S. to accidental or deliberate infection. 
• Increased reliance on pesticides and herbicides has established a 
precursor state, wherein pesticide-immune and herbicide-resistant 
antagonists could decimate arable crop staples. 
• Lack of crop diversity renders U.S. farmlands especially vulnerable to 
“cropicide” agroterrorist attacks. The lack of diversity, wherein single 
crops are grown over thousands of acres, renders the entire crop 
susceptible to a single pathological organism, and makes it easier for a 
terrorist to select effective crop pathogens. 
• Lack of diversity is compounded by the fact that 80 percent of the 
nation’s seed derives from one locale, the Idaho valley, due to the 
exceptionally dry climate in that region. 
• A notable percentage of imported hybrid seeds used for crop 
production in the U.S. comes from just four countries: Mexico, Chile, 
Iran, and China. Worryingly, the latter two countries have been 
suspected of having covert bio-agricultural weapons development 
programs. Reliance on so few sources for the purchase of imported 
seed begets the possibility that agroterrorists could silently insinuate 
diseased seed into orders shipped to the United States. 
• The soil itself is an ignored, and inadequately protected resource. 
Perhaps as much as half of the nation’s topsoil blanket that existed 50 
years ago has been lost due to runoff, intensive heavy equipment 
usage, and winds. Agroterrorist schemes that threaten topsoil viability 
– most likely through the use of a long-acting soil sterilant – pose long-
term dangers to America’s farmland productivity. 
• A variety of pathogenic or market-value inhibiting agents that are 
foreign to U.S. animals and crops – and hence could spread rapidly in 
the absence of natural immunities or predators – are readily obtainable 
from a multitude of overseas sources. American agriculture is believed 
to be highly vulnerable to many of these agents.25 
 
Dr. Peter Chalk, in “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential 
Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food 
Industry”, identified additional factors that contribute to the U.S. agricultural and 
food industry’s vulnerability to an agroterrorism attack: 
                                            
25 Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., “Current Trends in Agro-Terrorism (Antilivestock, Anticrop, and 
Antisoil Bioagricultural Terrorism) and Their Potential Impact on Food Security,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, March 2000, pp. 110-113. 
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• Insufficient farm and food-related security measures are taking place 
on U.S. farms, and at auctions, sale barns, and processing packing 
plants.  In addition, many facilities do not keep sufficient records of 
their distribution network, making it difficult to trace a tainted food item 
back to its source. 
• The U.S. animal disease reporting system is not clearly defined. 
Producers have the responsibility to report unusual disease 
occurrences. Once the emergency management system gets involved, 
however, there is confusion brought on by the lack of guidelines that 
designate the appropriate agencies and personnel that need to be 
contacted in the event of a serious disease outbreak. Because of the 
reluctance of producers to report an animal disease, for fear of the 
consequences of doing so, and the inefficiencies of  the emergency 
management system, the current animal disease reporting system 
does little to promote early warning and identification of disease 
outbreaks. 
• The number of veterinarians trained to recognize and treat exotic 
livestock diseases is declining. This has resulted in a shortage of 
veterinarians with the expertise to deal with an agroterrorism incident 
caused by a foreign animal disease agent. 
• An increasing number of animals are receiving no form of 
comprehensive medical examination or remedial checkup, leading to 
increased opportunity for diseases to be overlooked. The reasons for 
this are that the size and scale of agriculture have made it impossible 
for producers to tend to their animals on an individual basis, and the 
shrinking pool of accredited and state and local veterinarians.26 
 
Taken together, these factors show there are many vulnerabilities to, and 
throughout, the U.S. food supply system. In addition, there is the possibility of 
terrorist groups turning to smaller-scale tactics against more accessible targets in 
the current climate where the capacity for al Qaeda and similar groups to conduct 
mass-casualty attacks inside the United States has been disrupted.27 
 
                                            
26 Chalk, Peter, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 
Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry”, available at 
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf, accessed November 3, 2004, pp. 10-
13. 
27 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction [Gilmore Commission], Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, II, 
Reassuring the Threat, December 15, 2002, p. 10, available at 
www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf, accessed January 14, 2005. 
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C.  INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC THREATS 
Recently-discovered documentation shows that the United States is at risk 
for agroterrorism attacks from foreign and domestic organizations. Following the 
invasion of Afghanistan, hundreds of U.S. agricultural documents translated into 
Arabic were seized in that country.28 The documents were attributed to the al 
Qaeda terrorist network and suggest the organization has a great interest in 
American agriculture. A significant portion of the organization’s training manual is 
reportedly devoted to the destruction of crops, livestock, and food processing 
facilities.29  
Domestic groups also constitute a threat to the U.S. food supply system. 
Although most do not think of them as terrorists, members of groups such as the 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) have 
engaged in what many consider terrorist activity. These two groups alone, since 
1996, have executed 600 violent acts and caused more than $40 million in 
damages.30 The Ayn Rand Institute’s MediaLink Department estimates that 
animal rights activists conduct more than 1,000 terrorist acts annually, including 
bombings, fires, and thefts.31 Animal rights groups, including ALF, ELF, People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Last Chance for Animals, are 
believed to have more than one million members.32 Membership in these groups, 
and others like them, do not make someone a terrorist. However, the actions 
espoused by these and other groups, are cause for concern. Take for example a 
                                            
28 Peters, Katherine McIntire, “Officials Fear Terrorist Attack on U.S. Food Supply,” 
GovExec.com, June 10, 2003, available at www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0603/061003kp1.htm, 
accessed October 14, 2004. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Milbourn, Todd, “Lawmakers Target ‘Eco-Terrorism’,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), April 7, 
2002, available at www.amprogress.org/News/News.cfm, accessed October 14, 2004. 
31 Putze, Aaron, “Public Must Take a Stand Against Animal Rights Activists,” Iowa Farm 
Bureau, November 3, 2001, available at www.furcommission.com/resource.perspect999ap.htm, 
accessed October 14, 2004. 
32 Ibid. 
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statement by Ingrid Newkirk, the co-founder and president of PETA, concerning 
the introduction of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United States. 
I openly hope that it comes here. It will bring economic harm only 
for those who profit from giving people heart attacks and giving 
animals a concentration camp-like existence. It would be good for 
animals, good for human health and good for the environment.33 
The above statement suggests that animal rights groups, and perhaps 
other radical groups, may engage in the use of terrorist tactics to imitate the 
success of foreign terrorist groups, and that the threats to American agriculture 
are right here in America.34 
D.  EFFECTS OF TERRORISM 
An attack on America’s agricultural sector would extend beyond the 
targeted component of the food supply system and cause economic disruption 
throughout the U.S. economy, undermine the public’s trust in government, and 
create social instability.35  
The most immediate effect of an act of agroterrorism would likely be 
economic disruption, generating at least three expected levels of costs. First 
would be direct losses resulting from containment measures and the eradication 
of disease-ridden animals. Second, indirect multiplier effects would accrue from 
both the compensation paid to farmers for the destruction of agricultural 
commodities and the revenue deficits suffered by both directly and indirectly 
related industries. Third, international trade costs would be incurred in the form of 
protective embargoes imposed by major external export partners.36 
                                            
33 Elsner, Alan, Reuters, “Hoping for Disease: PETA Hopes Foot-and-Mouth Strikes in the 
United States,” ABCNews.com, April 2, 2001, available at 
www.animalscam.com/downloads/peta_abcnews.pdf, accessed October 14, 2004. 
34 Gordon, Ellen M., Multi-State Initiatives—Agriculture Security Preparedness, Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2004. p. 9. 
35 Chalk, Peter, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 
Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry”, available at 
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf, accessed November 3, 2004, p. xi. 
36 Ibid., p. 19. 
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A second effect of an agroterrorism incident could be the loss of the 
public’s confidence in and support for the government.37 As happened following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the public would want to 
know how their government could let terrorists attack our food supply and why it 
did not put into place the proper preventive measures.  The consequences of an 
attack could also generate much public criticism. The slaughter of large numbers 
of animals and disposal of the carcasses, for instance, could cause considerable 
opposition from interested groups, including the livestock owners and animal 
rights activists.38 
Social instability, in the forms of fear and anxiety, is a third consequence 
that could arise from an agroterrorism attack.39 An attack on one component of 
the food supply system could lead to fear of consuming the targeted food or 
product. That fear could produce economic repercussions even beyond the 
targeted product and well into the future. 
An agroterrorism incident could exact great economic, political, and social 
costs. Having a strategy in place to inform the public about the risks that could 
result from an agroterrorism incident could mitigate some or all of those costs. 
Chapter V will discuss the factors that communicators must take into 
consideration when developing a strategy for communicating agroterrorism risk 
to the public. 
 
 
                                            
37 Chalk, Peter, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate 
Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry”, available at 
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf, accessed November 3, 2004, p. 22. 
38 Ibid., p. 22. 
39 Ibid., p. 25. 
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V. AGROTERRORISM RISK COMMUNICATION:  
CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS 
As was defined in the previous chapter, agroterrorism is the deliberate 
introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into other aspects of 
the food chain, to undermine socioeconomic stability and/or generate fear. The 
targets of agroterrorism can be anything or anyone within the food supply 
system, from the farm to the dining table. It can be a tactic to generate economic, 
social, and political disruption, or as a form of direct human aggression. The 
characteristics and consequences of an act of agroterrorism, whether an actual 
incident or the threat of an act, call for a tailored approach to communicating the 
resultant risks. Three factors in particular must be taken into consideration when 
communicating risk in an agroterrorism context: recognition that communication 
of risk about food carries with it specific challenges; the public’s level of trust in 
government will affect how it perceives and accepts risk messages; and 
Americans’ post-September 11, 2001 fear of terrorism alters perception and 
acceptance of risk.  
A. COMMUNICATION OF FOOD RISK 
Food is more than just fuel for our bodies—it is an important part of our 
lives and cultures. From the turkey we share with our family and friends on 
Thanksgiving to the cake cut by the bride and groom, food has an importance 
beyond the calories it provides. Food is essential to survival, and any risk 
associated with its consumption is special cause for concern to consumers, and 
therefore, of particularly special concern to risk communicators.  
Few things concern the public more than a known or perceived breakdown 
in the food safety chain. Because of the increasing concern over and awareness 
of food safety issues and the place food has in our lives, communicating about 
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related risk is different than communicating about any other type of risk because 
of the intrinsic qualities of food and the public’s perception of food risk.40  
We must have food to live. It is both a commodity and a luxury that we 
share with friends, family, and acquaintances. It is part of our cultural heritage 
and identity. Yet, to most of modern society, the process whereby, for instance, 
milk makes its way from a dairy farm to the dinner table, is an unknown. 
Evolution from a society that was once primarily rural to one that is mainly urban 
has caused the public to lose touch with the food chain and to feel they have lost 
control over the food they eat. This has forced the public to place great trust in 
farmers, processors, wholesalers, and food service establishments that the food 
they provide will be safe.  
This lack of connection with and understanding of the food supply has also 
contributed to the public’s impression that food is becoming another source of 
risk.41 Food carries an inherent degree of risk, and since we all need food to 
survive, we are forced to take risks each time we eat. Although people have 
learned to avoid obvious risks, through proper cleaning and preparation, and 
modern technological developments have made our food safer, research shows 
that the public has become more concerned about food-related risks than ever 
before. This increased concern follows recent food scares, including salmonella 
in eggs, dioxin in Belgian chicken feed, and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE or mad cow disease) in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United 
States.42  
Public information about food and the impact it has on health can be 
overwhelming and confusing, leading people to worry about what they eat. In a 
                                            
40 Chartier, Jean and Gabler, Sandra, “Risk Communication and Government, Theory and 
Application for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,”  Fall 2000, available at 
www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/publications/riscomm/riscomme.shtml, accessed October 
1, 2004. 
41 Ibid. 
42 “An Introduction to Food Risk Communication: Lessons Learned from the Acrylamide 
Scare,” EUFIC Review No 12, April 2003, available at www.eufic.org, accessed December 10, 
2004. p. 1. 
21 
study on public perception of food safety, researchers found that food hazards 
may be perceived differently than other hazards because people are dependent 
on food in ways they are not dependent on other risk makers.43 Add to that the 
“mystery” of the process by which food travels from the farm to the table and the 
public’s lack of connection with the food they eat, and you have a recipe for 
alarm and misunderstanding that may prevent the public from hearing the 
message the risk communicator is trying to convey. 
1. Risk Perception 
Food is the target by which terrorists will attempt to achieve their goals in 
an agroterrorism incident. While providing information to the public that will 
educate and provide instruction on how to handle or respond to food hazards 
during an agroterrorism incident is very important, communicators must also take 
into consideration the public’s perception of the associated risk.  
Risk communication expert Peter Sandman describes risk as having two 
components: hazard, or the scientific aspect of the danger, and outrage, the 
audience’s other concerns about the danger. The “Risk = Hazard + Outrage” 
model explains the importance of the public’s perception of risk and the 
implications it has on communicators’ ability to convey information to their 
audience. In this approach, the audience’s view of risk reflects not only the 
expert’s assessment of the situation (hazard), but also how the audience feels 
about the situation (outrage). The audience’s perception of the risk, in this case, 
is as important as the actual risk. 
2. Outrage Factors 
An important determinant of how people process risk information involves 
the factors that affect how they judge the actual magnitude of the risk.44 
                                            
43 Chartier, Jean and Gabler, Sandra, “Risk Communication and Government, Theory and 
Application for the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,”  Fall 2000, available at 
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Research, which began in the 1960s, has concluded that there is a low 
correlation between the experts’ assessment of the level of physical risk in a 
situation and the amount of worry it arouses in people. It was found that even 
more important in determining peoples’ responses are “outrage factors,” that 
include: 
• Voluntariness. Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or 
imposed are judged to be greater, and are therefore less readily 
accepted, than risks from activities that are seen to be voluntary. 
• Controllability. Risks from activities viewed as under the control of 
others are judged to be greater, and are less readily accepted, than 
those from activities that appear to be under the control of the 
individual. 
• Familiarity. Risks from activities viewed as unfamiliar are judged to be 
greater than risks from activities viewed as familiar. 
• Fairness. Risks from activities believed to be unfair or to involve unfair 
processes (e.g., inequities related to the siting of industrial facilities or 
landfills) are judged to be greater than risks from fair activities (e.g., 
vaccinations).  
• Benefits. Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable, 
or diffused personal or economic benefits (e.g., waste disposal 
facilities) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that have 
clear benefits (jobs; monetary benefits; automobile driving).  
• Catastrophic potential. Risks from activities viewed as having the 
potential to cause a significant number of deaths and injuries grouped 
in time and space are judged to be greater than risks from activities 
that cause deaths and injuries scattered or random in time and space. 
• Understanding. Poorly understood risks are judged to be greater than 
risks that are well understood or self-explanatory. 
• Uncertainty. Risks from activities that are relatively unknown or that 
pose highly uncertain risks are judged to be greater than risks from 
activities that appear to be relatively well known to science. 
• Delayed effects. Risks from activities that may have delayed effects 
(e.g., long latency periods between exposure and adverse health 
effects) are judged to be greater than risks from activities viewed as 
having immediate effects (e.g., poisonings).  
• Effects on children. Risks from activities that appear to put children 
specifically at risk (e.g., milk contaminated with radiation or toxic 
chemicals; pregnant women exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) 
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are judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not (e.g., 
workplace accidents).  
• Effects on future generations. Risks from activities that seem to pose a 
threat to future generations (e.g., adverse genetic effects due to 
exposure to toxic chemicals or radiation) are judged to be greater than 
risks from activities that do not (e.g., skiing accidents).  
• Victim identity. Risks from activities that produce identifiable victims 
(e.g., a worker exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals or radiation; a 
child who falls down a well; a miner trapped in a mine) are judged to be 
greater than risks from activities that produce statistical victims (e.g., 
statistical profiles of automobile accident victims).  
• Dread. Risks from activities that evoke fear, terror, or anxiety are 
judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not arouse such 
feelings or emotions. 
• Trust. Risks from activities associated with individuals, institutions or 
organizations lacking in trust and credibility are judged to be greater 
than risks from activities associated with those that are trustworthy and 
credible. 
• Media attention. Risks from activities that receive considerable media 
coverage are judged to be greater than risks from activities that receive 
little. 
• Accident history. Risks from activities with a history of major accidents 
or frequent minor accidents (e.g., leaks at waste disposal facilities) are 
judged to be greater than risks from those with little or no such history 
(e.g., recombinant DNA experimentation).  
• Reversibility. Risks from activities considered to have potentially 
irreversible adverse effects (e.g., birth defects from exposure to a toxic 
substance) are judged to be greater than risks from activities 
considered to have reversible adverse effects (e.g., sports injuries).  
• Personal stake. Risks from activities viewed by people to place them 
(or their families) personally and directly at risk (e.g., living near a 
waste disposal site) are judged to be greater than risks from activities 
that appear to pose no direct or personal threat (e.g., disposal of waste 
in remote areas).  
• Ethical/moral nature. Risks from activities believed to be ethically 
objectionable or morally wrong (e.g., foisting pollution on an 
economically distressed community) are judged to be greater than 
risks from ethically neutral activities (e.g., side effects of medication).  
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• Human vs. natural origin. Risks generated by human action, failure or 
incompetence are judged to be greater than risks caused by nature or 
“Acts of God”.45 
These findings revealed that people often perceive or assess risk more in 
terms of these “outrage” factors than in terms of potential for “real” harm or 
hazard. Several of these factors have a bearing on communicating risk from an 
agroterrorism incident, most notably voluntariness, controllability, familiarity, 
catastrophic potential, uncertainty, dread, trust, media attention, reversibility, and 
human versus natural origin. Understanding the existence of these factors will 
help communicators gauge how a risk will be accepted by the public and must be 
considered when communicating the risk to food following an agroterrorism 
incident. For example, since risks viewed to be under the control of the individual 
are more readily accepted than those viewed under the control of others, it is 
important for communicators to include actions the public may take to ensure the 
safety of the food they eat.  
3. Food Risk Factors:  Implication for Communicators 
The implication for risk communicators is that the cultural and emotional 
meanings attached to food, combined with people’s dependence on it to live, 
may make it difficult for them to reach the public simply by providing factual 
information about the hazard and what actions they may or should take in 
response. Peoples’ outrage, or emotion and feelings in relation to a hazard, 
cannot be ignored. The audience’s opinions and feelings must be taken into 
consideration and addressed in any communication about an agroterrorism risk. 
This means a dialogue must be established with the audience in which not only 
do they receive information from the communicator, but the communicator listens 
to, and takes into account, how the audience perceives a hazard and how they 
feel about the resultant risk. 
One-way communication, while of value in many situations and for many 
purposes, will not be sufficient to address all the factors that shape the public’s 
perception of how an attack on the food supply may affect their health and that of 
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their family. Through dialogue with the public, the communicator can begin to 
understand how the public perceives the risk and can then take steps to address 
their concern through the application of various communication methods. 
B. PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
If an agroterrorism incident were to occur in the United States, the primary 
responsibility for providing information to the public would fall to government 
communicators in the areas of agriculture, emergency management, and 
homeland security. While it is logical that government agencies responsible for 
regulating agriculture and responding to an agroterrorism incident take the lead 
in providing information to the public, there are significant challenges faced for 
those performing that task.  
Trust is the most essential element of any successful risk communication 
venture. Yet, building and retaining the public’s trust, and being perceived as a 
trusted source of information, is a major hurdle for government risk 
communicators because a large percentage of Americans say they do not place 
great trust their government. In a November 2004 Gallup Poll of U.S. residents, 
32 percent of respondents said they had little or no trust in their state 
government, 31 percent said they had little or no trust in their local government, 
and 41 percent said they had little or no trust in the executive branch of the 
federal government.46 These figures show that a significant percentage of the 
population may not receive information about potential or real risks because of 
the lack of trust they have in all levels of government. 
When it comes to assessing trust and credibility of government 
communications efforts, there are some key factors the public uses in its 
evaluation: empathy and caring; competence and expertise; honesty and 
openness; and dedication and commitment.47 Of those factors, more than 50 
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47 Washington, D.C. Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, “Communicating in a Crisis:  Risk Communication Guidelines for Public 
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percent of a communicator’s credibility will depend on whether or not they are 
perceived as empathetic and caring and in most situations, the audience will 
decide this in the first nine to 30 seconds.48  
1. Public Trust in Government:  Implication for Communicators 
If the public does not perceive their government as trustworthy, then they 
will not accept the message the government is conveying. The implication for risk 
communicators is that citizens may not take actions that are important to 
maintain their health or safety during or after an agroterrorism incident. To be 
perceived as a trusted source of information, government communicators must 
work to establish credibility prior to an incident, with the public and the media, 
and apply risk communication principles that will maintain or increase the public’s 
trust during and following the incident. 
C. FEAR OF TERRORISM 
Terrorism is now a reality in the United States. Part of that new reality is 
Americans’ fear of a terrorist attack.  An Associated Press poll published in April 
2004, showed that fears about an attack against the United States remain high. 
Two-thirds of the respondents in the poll said it was likely terrorists would strike 
before the November elections and one-third said it was likely there would be an 
attack at one of the political conventions during the summer of 2004.49 In 
addition, in a recent Cornell University survey, 37 percent of Americans believe a 
terrorist attack in the United States is still likely within the next 12 months.50 
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Risk communication expert David Ropiek says Americans are afraid 
because they are facing a risk that is new, catastrophic, dreadful, personal, full of 
uncertainty and dominates our awareness.  
• New vs. familiar. Terrorism is a relatively new threat to Americans and 
research shows people are more afraid of risks that are new and less 
afraid of risks with which they have lived for awhile and become 
familiar. 
• Catastrophic vs. chronic. People are more afraid of risks that kill large 
numbers of people all at once and all in one place than those that kill 
people over a dispersed area and over time. Victims of terrorism all die 
at the same time and in one place, making it rate as high as possible 
on the “Catastrophic vs. Chronic” scale. 
• Dread. Risk perception research shows that people are more afraid of 
risks that kill them in “really awful ways” than risks that lead to deaths 
that are more peaceful. Deaths from acts of terrorism are high on the 
dread scale. 
• Me vs. them. The risk of terrorism is now real for Americans. It is no 
longer something that might happen to someone else, somewhere 
else. When people see a risk as a risk to themselves, they are more 
afraid than if they see that same risk as only threatening to someone 
else.  
• Uncertainty. Americans do not know what may come next, when or 
where something might happen, or where terrorists are located. 
According to risk perception studies, the more uncertain people are, 
the more afraid they are.  
• Awareness. People tend to be more afraid of the risks of which they 
are more aware. Right now, terrorism rates high on peoples’ 
awareness scales. 
These powerful emotional triggers, also discussed earlier in this chapter in 
relation to outrage and its affect on perception of risk, are at the roots of 
Americans’ fears and understanding them can help explain why the fear of a 
terrorist incident is so high.51  
1. Fear of Terrorism:  Implication for Communicators 
The implication for risk communicators is that they must be prepared to 
address the public’s fears, and the perceptions that drive those fears, if their 
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message is to be heard. By understanding the reasons people perceive risks as 
they do, communicators can convey information in terms and language that are 
relevant to peoples’ concerns. 
Risk communication which acknowledges and respects the 
affective motivators which underlie people’s concerns, rather than 
dismissing their perceptions as “irrational” because they are not 
solely fact-based, is likely to be more successful in helping people 
make more informed choices about the risks they face.52 
As has been demonstrated in this chapter, communicating about risk 
resulting from an agroterrorism incident is different than communicating about 
other types of risk. Communicators must first understand the factors that make 
agroterrorism risk communication unique, and then use that understanding to 
tailor the approach they use to inform the public. Chapter VI will discuss how the 
Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture may apply tried-and-true risk 
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The Multi-State Partnership for Security in Agriculture, as part of its 
Agriculture Counterterrorism Project, has defined the need for a strategy for how 
it, and its member states, will communicate to the public the risk associated with 
an attack on the United States food supply system.  
As the Partnership develops its strategy, it must take into consideration 
the three factors, as outlined in the previous chapter, that are important when 
communicating about risk in an agroterrorism context: recognition that 
communication of risk about food carries with it specific challenges; the public’s 
level of trust in government will affect how it perceives and accepts risk 
messages; and Americans’ post-September 11, 2001 fear associated with 
terrorism alters perception and acceptance of risk. 
Recognition of the existence of these factors is not enough, however. The 
Partnership must recognize, as well, that these factors may present barriers to 
effective communication. To overcome these barriers, the Partnership should 
apply risk communication principles, as presented in Chapter III. Doing so would 
enable the Partnership to more effectively communicate agroterrorism risk to the 
public. 
A. APPLICATION OF RISK COMMUNICATION RULES TO 
AGROTERRORISM 
Dr. Vincent Covello has outlined seven rules for effectively communicating 
risk to the public. Following are recommendations for application of these rules to 
the three factors determined to be important when communicating agroterrorism 
risk. 
RULE 1.  ACCEPT AND INOLVE THE PUBLIC AS A LEGITIMATE 
PARTNER 
There are two basic tenets of risk communication in a democracy. 
First, people have a right to participate in decisions that affect their 
lives. Second, the goal of risk communication is not to diffuse 
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concerns, but to encourage the public to be involved, interested, 
reasonable, thoughtful, solution-oriented, and collaborative.53  
Partnerships with the public, formed prior to an agroterrorism incident, are 
the foundation upon which true dialogue can be built. To promote this vital 
partnership: 
• Employ methods, outlined in rule number three, below, to gain a better 
understanding of the public’s concerns, then seek their solutions. 
• Build a track record. The Partnership and member states should show 
the public that they are aware of their concerns and are addressing 
them, and have addressed them in the past. 
 
RULE 2.  PLAN CAREFULLY AND EVALUATE PERFORMANCE. 
Different goals, audiences, and media require different risk 
communication strategies. Risk communication will be successful 
only if carefully planned and evaluated.54 
The Partnership must clearly define its risk communication objectives, 
which, based on the conclusions of this thesis, are building and keeping the 
public’s trust and promoting dialogue and exchange of information. Doing so will 
assist the Partnership and its member states as they develop plans to 
communicate with the public. Clearly-defined objectives are needed in order to 
most effectively determine in what form information should be communicated, by 
whom, and through what medium. Examples of planning include: 
• Defining the message. 
• Determining the most effective medium through which information 
should be distributed. 
• Identifying credible and trusted spokespersons. 
• Identifying capable and knowledgeable communication professionals 
and training them on the communicating organization’s procedures and 
philosophies, ensuring consistent delivery of the organization’s 
message. 
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Evaluation of procedures and practices results in better 
communication. Information gained from the evaluation of one effort 
can be used to strengthen future efforts.55  
The Partnership should consider the following evaluation methods: 
• Surveys and interviews. These may be conducted by telephone, mail, 
through a feedback mechanism on a Web site, or by conducting focus 
groups. Because of the large size of the consumer base affected by a 
food risk, care should be taken to conduct surveys and interviews in 
numbers large enough to be meaningful and representative. 
• Review of risk communication plans, messages, and methods by 
experts schooled in the theories, principles, and practices of risk 
communication. 
 
RULE 3.  LISTEN TO YOUR AUDIENCE. 
People in the community are often more concerned about issues 
such as trust, credibility, control, competence, voluntariness, 
fairness, caring, and compassion than about mortality statistics and 
the details of quantitative risk assessment. If you do not listen to 
people, you cannot expect them to listen to you. Communication is 
a two-way activity.56 
This is perhaps the most important rule to apply to agroterrorism risk 
communication. Listening to the public, and using the understanding that can be 
gained to establish a dialogue, will help to focus communication efforts. One-way 
communication is not sufficient when conveying agroterrorism risk for two 
reasons:  
• The cultural and emotional meanings attached to food, along with 
people’s dependence on it for survival, make it difficult to reach the 
public simply by providing factual information about the hazard and the 
actions they may or should take. People’s outrage, or their emotions 
and feelings, must be taken into consideration and addressed in any 
communication about an agroterrorism risk.  
                                            
55 Lundgren, Regina and McMakin, Andrea, Risk Communication:  A Handbook for 
Communicating Environmental, Safety, and Health Risks, p. 376. 
56 Covello, Vincent T., McCallum, David B., and Pavlova, Maria T., eds., Effective Risk 




• The public’s fears and the perceptions that drive those fears must be 
addressed. Through understanding the reasons people perceive risks 
as they do, communicators can convey information that is relevant to 
peoples’ concerns.  
 
Therefore, the Partnership should engage the public in two-way dialogue 
to understand their perceptions of the risk, and then use that understanding to 
employ communication methods and tools. This dialogue may be achieved 
through a variety of activities, including: 
• Conducting surveys and focus groups of representative samplings of 
consumers. 
• Forming citizen advisory groups. 
• Developing a Web site where the public may not only obtain 
information, but may also provide feedback, such as through forums 
and submission forms. 
• Establishing a toll-free telephone number where the public may call 
with questions or concerns. Use the toll-free number, along with the 
Web site, to gather and analyze public input. 
 
RULE 4.  BE HONEST, FRANK AND OPEN. 
In communicating risk information, trust and credibility are your 
most precious assets. Trust and credibility are difficult to obtain. 
Once lost they are almost impossible to regain.57 
As was discussed in Chapter V, the public often does not perceive 
government as a trusted source of information. As a collaboration of government 
entities, this will prove to be a challenge for the Partnership, since the public 
must perceive the source of risk information as being trustworthy before it will 
accept the message being conveyed. Without that trust in the message bearer 
and the message, the public may not take actions that are important to maintain 
their health and safety during or after an agroterrorism incident. To be perceived 
                                            
57 Ibid., p. 303. 
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as a trusted source of information, the Partnership and its member states must 
do the following: 
• Trust the public enough to tell the truth. Do so carefully, using 
language that is clear and easily understood. 
• Do not minimize nor inflate facts or other information pertaining to the 
situation or the resulting risk. 
• When appropriate, use comparisons to help the public understand the 
true implications of a risk. 
• Choose spokespersons with care. People who are empathetic, 
straightforward, knowledgeable and comfortable before the media and 
the public will engender trust. 
• Avoid speculation. If the answer to a question is not known, say so, 
and give an expectation as to when the answer will be available. Then 
make the information available when promised. 
• Admit mistakes, if made, and correct errors immediately. 
 
RULE 5.  COORDINATE AND COLLABORATE WITH OTHER 
CREDIBLE SOURCES. 
Allies can help you communicate risk information effectively. Few 
things make risk communication more difficult than conflicts or 
disagreements with other credible sources.58 
The Partnership is the result of member states recognizing the need for a 
collaborative approach to the challenge of agroterrorism. Lack of a strategy to 
provide the public with a unified, coordinated message could lead to the release 
of conflicting information or misinformation, and ultimately result in fear and loss 
of public confidence in agricultural products. To counter this, the Partnership 
must: 
• Collaboratively develop coordinated messages, including pre-scripted 
materials on the risks that could result from an agroterrorism incident. 
• Develop and agree upon a plan for release of information, including 
who will release information, through what mediums, and when it will 
be released. 
• Provide a uniform and consistent message in an environment when the 
state does not control all sources of information to the media and the                                             
   58 Ibid. 
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public.59 If possible, work with organizations outside of government, 
such as livestock and grain producer associations, to share plans and 
ideas. Enlist their assistance when developing plans and information, 
and coordinate release of information during and following an incident. 
 
RULE 6.  MEET THE NEEDS OF THE MEDIA. 
The media are prime transmitters of information on risks. They play 
a critical role in setting agendas and in determining outcomes. The 
media are generally more interested in politics than in risk; more 
interested in simplicity than in complexity; and more interested in 
danger than in safety.60 
The media can be a partner or it can be an adversary. During or after an 
agroterrorism incident, communicators will need the media to help them provide 
the public with information that could be important to protecting their health and 
safety. To promote media partnership, the following activities are especially 
important: 
• Respect reporters’ deadlines. Try to meet their deadlines whenever 
possible, and when it is not possible, explain why.  
• Be accessible and responsive to their requests for information. Return 
calls promptly and if follow-up is required, do so in as timely a manner 
as possible. 
• Develop resource materials so they are available when journalists 
need them--at the onset of an emergency or crisis. Helping the media 
to be better prepared also helps the communicating organization. 
Reporters who have a better understanding of a topic will be able to 
better inform the public. 
• Get to know local media and foster good working relationships.  
• Be prepared for an onslaught of media requests. An agroterrorism 
incident will generate regional, national, and even international interest. 
• Educate the media about the challenges government may face during 
an agroterrorism incident. Understanding the constraints within which 
an organization works during an emergency or crisis will help shape 
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p. 303. 
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media expectations.61 Involve media in exercises to help them better 
understand the constraints and challenges faced by government 
organizations during emergencies. 
RULE 7.  SPEAK CLEARLY AND WITH COMPASSION. 
Technical language and jargon are useful as professional 
shorthand. But they are barriers to successful communication with 
the public. In situations of great concern, such as an agroterrorism 
incident, empathy and caring often are more effective than numbers 
and technical facts.62  
When people are faced with a risk that is unfamiliar or causes great 
anxiety or fear, the Partnership and its members need to take particular care with 
what they say and how they say it. Some guidelines include: 
• Use of clear, non-technical language. Do not use jargon or acronyms. 
• If deaths or illness do occur, avoid using distant, abstract, unfeeling 
language. Be real. The public will respond to genuine emotion. 
• Acknowledge and respond, with both actions and words, to emotions 
such as anxiety, anger, fear, anger, outrage, and helplessness. 
• Use risk comparisons to help put risks into perspective.63 
The previous suggestions for overcoming the barriers associated with 
agroterrorism risk communication are meant to provide a foundation upon which 
the Partnership may approach the development of its risk communication 
strategy. As has been stated in this thesis, communicators must carefully 
consider not only the risk itself, but how the audience may respond to that risk, 
based on factors such as cultural values, trust, and fear. When it comes to 
communicating about agroterrorism risk, perception really is reality. The 
Partnership must gain an understanding of the public’s perceptions if it is to truly 
communicate effectively the risks associated with agroterrorism. 
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APPENDIX 
If a component of America’s food supply system were to be attacked by a 
terrorist, there would be a great need for coordinated and timely information to 
the public. This guide has been developed as a resource for the Multi-State 
Partnership for Security in Agriculture and its member states and contains 
information useful for communicating risk before, during, and after an 
agroterrorism incident. The recommendations included in this guide are founded 
on basic risk communication principles that have been applied to specifically 
address the challenges associated with communication of a risk that is the result 
of an agroterrorism incident.  
A. PRE-INCIDENT 
Prior to an agroterrorism incident, it is important for the Partnership to 
educate the public on possible risks and also learn from the public how it 
perceives those risks. The Partnership must also educate the media and enlist it 
as a partner prior to an agroterrorism incident.  
1. Educate the Public 
Agroterrorism is a new and little-known threat in the United States. To help 
the public understand the hazards and resultant risks of an agroterrorism 
incident, The Partnership must educate the public prior to an attack, using the 
following guidelines: 
• Use clear, non-technical, easy-to-understand language when 
discussing hazards and their associated risks. 
• Do not use jargon or acronyms. 
• Provide information on steps the public may take to keep themselves 
and their families safe when they are faced with an agroterrorism-
related risk. 
• Provide information on steps producers need to follow to report 
suspected cases. 
• Make information easily accessible. Develop and promote a multi-
lingual Web site. 
• Collaborate with partners to develop educational messages and 
materials. 
• Initiate a dialogue with the public. 
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Through dialogue, the Partnership can gain an understanding of the 
public’s perceptions of agroterrorism risks, and then use that understanding to 
more effectively provide information. Dialogue may be achieved in several ways: 
• Conduct surveys and focus groups. 
• Form citizen advisory groups and use their input to tailor your 
message. 
• Develop a Web site where the public may not only get information, but 
which also provides a mechanism for feedback, such as through 
forums or submission forms. 
 
2. Partner with and Educate the Media 
The media is an important partner during an emergency or disaster. The 
Partnership can help the media inform the public by: 
• Developing and making available prior to an incident, resource 
materials. Reporters who have a better understanding of a topic will be 
able to better inform the public. 
• Educating the media about the challenges the Partnership and its 
member states may face during an agroterrorism incident may give 
them a better understanding and help to shape more realistic 
expectations of what Partnership members can and cannot do. 
• Involving the media in exercises to help them better understand the 
constraints your organizations face during an emergency. 
 
3. Planning 
In addition to educating and dialoging with the public, and partnering with 
and educating the media, the Partnership must plan for how it will communicate 
during an agroterrorism incident. Well-defined objectives are needed to most 
effectively determine in what form information should be communicated, by 
whom, and through what medium. Examples of planning include: 
• Defining the message and developing materials that address potential 
risks. 
• Determining how to best coordinate release of information to the 
public—for instance, whether the Partnership should establish a joint 
information center, develop a plan for release of information by 
individual member states, or coordinate information delivery by some 
other method. 
• Determining the most effective media through which information will be 
distributed during an incident. 
• Identifying credible and trusted spokespersons. 
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• Identifying communication professionals within your organization and 
training them on your organization’s procedures and philosophies to 
ensure consistent message delivery. 
 
B. DURING AN AGROTERRORISM INCIDENT 
The Partnership must provide to the public information that will ensure 
their safety during an agroterrorism incident. Good communication practices 
during an incident include: 
• Use of clear and concise language. 
• Use of a trusted spokesperson. Choose someone who is empathetic, 
straightforward, knowledgeable and comfortable before the public and 
the media. 
• Tell the truth and admit mistakes. Correct errors immediately. 
• Coordinate and collaborate with partners to ensure consistent 
messages are being delivered. 
• Establish a mechanism through which the public can obtain information 
and share concerns, such as a toll-free telephone number or a Web 
site with forum or feedback capabilities. 
• Establish a mechanism through which producers can obtain 
information and share concerns, such as a toll-free number or a Web 
site with forum or feedback capabilities. 
 
1. Meeting the Media’s Needs  
The media is an important partner for providing information to the public 
during an agroterrorism incident. There are several things the Partnership can do 
to meet the media’s needs: 
• Be accessible and responsive. 
• Return calls and provide follow-up information in as timely a manner as 
possible. 
• Respect reporters’ deadlines and try to meet them whenever possible. 
If that is not possible, explain why. 
• Provide information on a regular basis. If there is nothing new to share, 
let them know when you expect to have additional information. 
 
C. POST-INCIDENT 
Following an agroterrorism event, the Partnership should evaluate their 
risk communication efforts. This may be done through: 
• Public surveys and interviews, via telephone, mail, a Web-site feedback 
mechanism, or through in-person interviews such as focus groups. Use 
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these resources to help determine what worked, what didn’t work, and 
what could be done better next time. 
• Assessing the Partnership’s communication strategy and encouraging 
each member state to assess its communication efforts, including staffing 
and message delivery. 
 
Application of the previous recommendations will enable the Multi-State 
Partnership for Security in Agriculture to more effectively communicate 
agroterrorism risk to the public. Of course, not all recommendations are 
appropriate for use in every situation, but application of all or a portion of these 
methods and tools will prove useful for tackling the challenge of communicating 
agroterrorism risk. Additionally, these guidelines may be used by the Partnership, 
and other organizations, to communicate about the risk associated with 
outbreaks of naturally-occurring animal and plant disease, which would result in 
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